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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to examine the consequences of board diversity. The objectives 
are to measure the impact of gender, age, national diversity on earnings 
management (EM). This research study raises the following questions: Does board 
diversity affect earnings management and firm performance? Has the 2013 
Kuwait Corporate Governance Code impacted on board diversity on earnings 
management, beside firm performance? The research uses data from 103 non-
financial Kuwaiti listed companies in the period from 2010 to 2017. The data is 
collected from the companies’ data from secondary sources such as their annual 
reports. The data analysis methods are correlation, multi-regression and robust 
regression. Earnings management was measured using the model modified by 
Jones (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005). Firm performance measured by ROA, ROE, 
Tobin’s Q and total shareholder return. The independent variables are gender 
diversity, age diversity, nationality diversity, board size, board independent and 
role duality. Control variables are firm size, industry type, total debt, total 
revenue, oil price, percentage change oil price, gold price, the percentage change of 
gold price and, ROA. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This research aims to examine the consequences of board diversity. The 
objectives are to measure the impact of board diversity on earnings 
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management (EM) and on firm performance (FP). This research study 
raises the following questions: Does board diversity affect earnings 
management? Does board diversity affect firm performance? Has the 
2013 Kuwait Corporate Governance Code impacted on board diversity on 
earnings management and on firm performance? 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature review consists of two sections. Section 2.1 explains the 
background and context of this research. Section 2.2 reviews previous 
similar research studies. 
 
2.1. Background and research context 
 
2.1.1. Corporate governance 
 
There has been an increasing interest in corporate governance since the 
1990s arising from the major collapses of giant corporations and the 
privatisation of the public sector in the United Kingdom and the 
increased importance of globalization (Dreher et al., 2008) and (Vickers 
& Yarrow, 1991). This interest has been in parallel with many significant 
developments in corporate governance practices worldwide in response to 
these corporate and financial crises and in particular, the 2007 global 
financial crisis. There are various concepts of corporate governance 
depending on the time of the definition, the country's legal system and 
the country’s economic culture (Salacuse, 2002). Despite the different 
definitions of corporate governance, each share a common element which 
is that corporate governance is a set of mechanisms which arranges the 
relationship between the firm’s management, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. For example, according to the Cadbury Code of Corporate 
Governance (1999), corporate governance can be defined as “the system 
by which companies are directed and controlled”. On the other hand, La 
Portal et al. (2000), introduced corporate governance as a set of 
mechanisms which the firm’s external stakeholders could use to protect 
their interests and the rights of internal stakeholders such as the board 
of directors and shareholders. Furthermore, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2004, p. 11) defines 
corporate governance as follows: "Corporate governance involves a set of 
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives 
for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the 
interest of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate 
effective monitoring”. However, despite the fact that these definitions can 
identify some essential elements of corporate governance, the general 
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definitions remain vague. Perhaps, one of the clearer definitions is the 
one provided by Solomon (2007) that corporate governance is a set of 
mechanisms used to manage and control organizations in order to 
provide effective internal control systems and risk management. The 
next paragraph discusses agency theory, resource dependence theory, 
human capital theory and social capital theory. 
 
2.1.2. Theories related to diversity 
 
There are different theories, such as resource dependence, human 
capital, social capital, busyness, signaling, behavioral and agency 
theories, which can be used to study CG. This research used agency, 
resource dependence, human capital and social capital theories to study 
the relationship between board diversity (BD) and EM, besides FP. 
 
Agency theory 
 
The "Agency theory" is one of the main theories. At this point, it is very 
important to explain this theory in order to understand the context in 
which this study examines CG. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
agency theory is the relationship between shareholders and board of 
directors is a contract. This means that the first party (the shareholders) 
has an agreement with the second party (board of directors) whereby the 
second party manages the company’s resources (both financial and 
human resources) and looks after the first party’s interests. Hence, the 
agency theory differentiates between ownership and control whereby the 
shareholders own the company and the board of directors is responsible 
for managing the firm and, therefore, the shareholders' assets. Bhagat 
and Black (2002) explain that in an agency theory context the managers-
shareholders relationship is a major challenge since it is linked with 
Agency problems such as conflict of interest and information asymmetry. 
Consequently, agency theory problems arise from the separation between 
the firm’s shareholders and its managers. The board of directors, which 
sits between the shareholders and the managers is responsible for 
solving problems and working on behalf of the shareholders to protect 
their interests and wealth (Donaldson & Davis, 1991), (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2001) and (Rowley et al. 2017). Since the shareholders are a 
mix of men and women, the board of directors should consist, also, of a 
mix of men and women to provide “Board diversity” and solve the agency 
theory problem.  
 
Resource dependency theory 
 
Resource dependence theory refers to the impact of resource acquisition 
on organizational behavior (Hillman, et al., 2009). The theory is based on 
the principle that, in order to acquire resources, organizations must 
engage in transactions with other actors and organizations in their 
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environment (Pfeffer, 1982). In this regard, as explained by Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978), executives serve as the link between the firm and 
external factors through co-selecting the assets expected to survive. 
Therefore, they serve as an essential instrument in bringing basic 
components of ecological vulnerability into the firm. With regard to the 
board, the resource dependence theory addresses how the board 
facilitates access to valuable resources. As explained by Rondoy et 
al. (2006), the theory emphasizes a firm’s ability to form links to secure 
access to critical resources including capital, customers, suppliers and 
cooperative partners. Consequently, given that it is likely to have 
different insights, a more diverse board is seen as having a greater 
ability to understand the customer group. According to Thomsen & 
Conyon (2012), board diversity with regard to nationality, education, 
education, experience and background means that the board of directors 
has a considerable range of different knowledge and skills. Accordingly, 
they have greater insights into markets, customers, employees and 
business opportunities. This is likely to lead to a better understanding of 
business conditions and, hence, better organizational performance 
(Hillman et al., 2000). For instance, given that women have more 
insights, a gender diversified board of directors is better able to 
understand the needs of the entire market. Therefore, women 
representatives on the board are better able to understand women’s 
needs and the same is true for men representatives on the board 
(Hillman et al., 2007; Drees & Heugens, 2013). The same can be said of 
age diversity where having board members of different age brackets is 
essential if the firm is able to meet the needs of the market with regard 
to all age brackets. In addition, national diversity on the board of 
directors brings different insights with regard to the different 
nationalities. This is important in ensuring the company’s ability to 
acquire different resources that are vital to its success (Carter et al., 
2010). 
 
Human capital theory 
 
Human capital theory is based on the assumption that formal education 
is highly instrumental and necessary in improving a population’s 
productive capacity (Gibbons & Waldman, 2004). In other words, the 
theory postulates that an educated population is a productive population 
and, hence, education increases the firm’s productivity and efficiency 
through increasing the level of cognitive stock of economically productive 
human capability that is a product of innate abilities and investment in 
human beings. Based on Terjesen’s et al. (2009) research, gender 
differences result in a board of directors that has unique human capital. 
Similarly, having boards with different nationalities brings in unique 
human capital (Burgess & Tharenou, 2002). Consequently, those, who 
make it to the top, tend to be consistently better educated and with 
“Corporate Governance: Search for the Advanced Practices” 
Rome, February 28, 2019 
 
258 
better skills and, thus, bring in unique human capital. In turn, this 
results in better corporate performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). 
Similarly, Luckerath-Rovers, (2011) see age diversity as conferring the 
firm with differing levels of human capital and this is essential for 
organizational success. 
 
Social capital theory 
 
Social capital can be defined as all the resources, whether real or 
implicit, that a person or group accrues through possession of a long-
lasting network of institutionalized relationships of shared contact and 
respect (Sealy & Vinnicombe, 2007). Social capital entails advantages 
that individual or collective actors have owing to their location in the 
social network structure. Consequently, this theory advocates for 
diversity in the board of directors given that a diverse board of directors 
is able to bring in different types of social capital from its members (Niu 
& Chen, 2017). For instance, a gender diverse board is likely to have 
more social capital than a single gender board given that both genders 
differ a lot in terms of social capital. The same case applies to nationality 
of diverse boards (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). This is because the different 
nationalities have substantial differences that are likely to result in 
substantially diverse social capital (Luckerath-Rovers, 2011). In addition, 
age diversity on the board of directors brings with it a wealth of social 
capital. This is because different age groups have different insights needs 
and the inclusion of every age group on the board brings in t related to 
different social capitals. Therefore, a board, which has various diverse 
aspects, is likely to possess more social capital and, hence, it is likely to 
perform better than a board that has no diversity (Carter et al., 2010). 
 
2.1.3. Why Kuwait? 
 
The purpose of choosing Kuwait is that it has a different democratic 
policy. In democratic terms, Kuwait is the best of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) Countries and in 2017, was ranked 119 globally. This was 
the last time that Kuwaiti democracy was tested (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2017). The Kuwaiti Constitution, which was issued in 
1962, was the first Constitution in all GCC countries (Cordesman, 2018). 
The Kuwaiti Constitution, which is the fundamental law of the State, is 
the foundation of the instructions that apply to the country and its 
citizens (National Assembly, 2015). Also, in 1963, Kuwait set up the first 
National Assembly in GCC countries and, thereafter, was followed by 
Bahrain in 2002 (Cordesman, 2018). Also, in 2009, Kuwait was the first 
GCC country to introduce Kuwaiti women into its Parliament (Odine, 
2013) and (National Assembly, 2015). The Kuwait National Assembly, 
which is the country’s legislative authority, consists of 50 members 
elected by the Kuwaiti people. One of the National Assembly’s important 
tasks is the study of Ministerial decisions (Herb, 2002). When compared 
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to other GCC countries, Kuwait has an open economy because all the 
country’s investors want this market which contains comprehensive 
disclosure of all listed firms (Al-Shammari & Al-Sultan, 2010; 
Alotaibi, 2014). In addition, at the beginning of 2017, the Kuwaiti 
Government announced a vision of the new Kuwait in 2035 with the aim 
of changing Kuwait into a commercial, regional financial, and cultural 
centre attracting all investments (New Kuwait, n.d). Surprisingly, 
Kuwait was the first GCC country to establish a stock market in 1977. 
This was followed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain and 
the United Arabic Emirates in 1980, and lastly Qatar in 1990 (Cheikh 
et al., 2018). Conversely, Kuwait was the last GCC country to issue a 
Corporate Governance Code in March 2013 and began operating it in 
June of the same year (Capital Markets Authority, 2013). 
 
2.2. Review of similar research studies (empirical studies) 
 
2.2.1. Board diversity (dender, age & nationality) and earnings 
management 
 
Furthermore, Gull et al. (2018) and Peni and Vahamaa’s (2010) assume 
that women on the board provide greater motivation because, among 
other aspects, they have moral values that reduce the firm’s earnings 
management because they follow more conservative earnings 
management strategies. Also, Sanda et al. (2006) findings show that, in 
some developing countries, women comprise less than five percent of 
directorship and CEOs positions due to their management’s 
conservativeness. Sanda et al. (2006) and Peni and Vahamma’s (2010) 
findings show clear evidence that, where there is gender diversity within 
the firm, earnings management becomes effective because the gender 
parity is conservative, and they are cautious about spending and other 
forms of management.  
However, Al-Mamun’s et al. (2013) and Guedes’s et al. (2018) 
findings show that there is no direct connection between either gender 
diversity in the boardrooms or that the firm's management enhances 
good management skills in the earnings management to prevent 
unnecessary spending and similarly promote good monitoring. From 
their research study, Choi and Rainey (2010) drew similar conclusions 
that there was no positive relationship between gender parity and 
earnings management. Similarly, Strobl’s et al. (2016) findings show 
that, especially for top management, gender diversity is not directly 
correlated to better earnings. This implies that pressure to achieve 
equality in the representation of women may be counterproductive. 
Therefore, earnings management and gender parity are a firm’s 
independent variables and one does not necessarily affect the other. 
There are mixed results between board diversity and earnings 
management because of leverage; this is because some have high and 
others have low leverage. However, in either situation, all Nigerian 
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banks have the same earnings manipulations in Nigeria banks (Isa et al., 
2018). A group of authors, such as Lakhal et al. (2015), Susanto (2016) 
and Omoye et al. (2014) found a negative relationship between gender 
diversity and the probability of company engagement in a high EM 
practice. This means less manipulation on earnings management. 
Similarly, Riley & Chow (1992), Powell & Ansic (1997), Hinz et al. (1997), 
Triki Damak (2018), Clikean, et al. (2001), Enofe et al. (2017), and Zalata 
et al. (2018), found the same results in that gender diversity reduced the 
earnings management. Accordingly, Omoye et al. (2014) believe that the 
reasons for the reduction in earnings management are due to women on 
boards avoiding risk in financial decisions. In addition, in making 
decisions, men have fewer ethical standards than women (Omoye et al., 
2014). Na & Hong (2017) makes clear that male CEOs use aggressive 
discretionary accruals which increase firms’ earnings management. On 
the other hand, they did not find any female CEOs who used aggressive 
discretionary accruals on earnings management. Also, Gull et al. (2018) 
hypothesis is that the demographic diversity (e.g. behaviour, education 
background and experience) has the ability to monitor their activities 
and reduce the earnings management. However, the authors take into 
account that their hypothesis has been rejected and that demographic 
diversity has a positive relationship with earnings management (Gull at 
al., 2018). 
The author found no study in the literature review which 
systematically examined age diversity and earnings management. Age 
diversity is the existence of age groups in the top management positions 
such as CEO, the board of directors and line management (Lausten, 
2002) and (Carter et al., 2003). The appointment of young and older 
people to these positions brings about valuable management perspectives 
to that blend experience and creativity on the board of directors (Li et al., 
2014). While the young directors bring creativity to the monitoring 
process and make it less hectic and error-prone, the older directors blend 
their experiences to ensure the effectiveness and accuracy of the 
monitoring system (Wegge, et al., 2008).  
Author found few studies in the literature relating to national 
diversity. Hart’s (2014) findings show that diversity in the nationality of 
the board’s members brings divergent views to the board on management 
factors. This is because of their different backgrounds and experiences. 
From their examination, Isa & Farouk’s (2018) findings show that there 
is a significant positive relationship between foreign directors and 
earnings management. Ramaswamy et al. (2001) and French & Raven 
(1960) believe that foreign directors work in multi-position and firms 
that may have a good position that affect management process because of 
their export power. Gull at al. (2018) and Jiraporn et al. (2008) found 
that busyness theory that the directors’ busyness would be harmful to 
the firm. However, Baatour, Ben Othman & Hussainey (2017) found that 
there was no significant influence if the director had multiple 
directorships. In addition, Hooghiemstra’s et al. (2016) findings show a 
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significant relationship between foreign directors and the higher level of 
earnings management. This is because of their different accounting 
knowledge. Also, they believe that it is unnecessary to appoint non-
Nordic directors on the board.  
On the other hand, Enofe et al. (2017) found that there is a negative 
relationship in Nigerian firms between international diversity and 
earnings management. Also, their findings confirm that foreign directors 
have an important role in reducing earnings management (Enofe et al., 
2017). In contrast, Rauf’s et al. (2012) findings show that in Malaysian 
firms a foreign board does not affect earnings management, and they fail 
to find the evidence of that. 
 
2.2.2. Board diversity (gender, age & nationality) and firm performance 
 
Many authors, such as Rose (2007), Carteret et al. (2007), Gordini and 
Rancati (2017) and Adams and Ferreira (2009), examined the 
relationship between gender diversity and company performance. Gender 
diversity and performance is a significant concern in the labour market 
and various practices have been adopted as a strategy to improving a 
firm’s effectiveness (Miller et al., 2009). Both men and women have 
varying degrees of intelligence and, therefore, by making informed 
decisions from well-considered diverse perspectives, gender diversity can 
improve a firm’s performance (Damardi, 2010). In addition, Carter et al. 
(2003) and Gordini and Rancati (2017) found a positive relationship 
between the presence of women on the board and firm value as measured 
by Tobin’s Q. In a national American survey, firms, which had both men 
and women, had higher sales, higher profit margins and, consequently, 
higher revenues (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). A firm’s culture is mirrored 
by the link between gender diversity and performance (Julizaerma & 
Sori, 2012). A diverse workforce has a more significant breadth of views 
and, hence, it appears to be well placed to deal with any given 
circumstance (Carter et al., 2007). Carter’s et al. (2007) conclusion seems 
to contradict his earlier view that there is a positive relationship between 
gender diversity and company performance. According to Liu et al. 
(2014), in the ideal setting and particularly in managerial positions, 
gender diversity encourages a firm to perform better. Besides, women are 
useful in solving problems by listening more than their male 
counterparts. Also, Alshammari, and Alsaidi (2014) tested Kuwait 
women and firm performance in 121 firms in the period from 2009 to 
2011. Their findings show that Kuwaiti women directors have a positive 
relationship with firm performance. Joecks et al. (2013) reiterate that 
women can handle work stress while, at the same time, driving a firm to 
its desired position. Moreover, because women establish good 
relationship networks, gender diversity improves a firm’s successfulness 
and performance (Martín-Ugedo & Minguez-Vera, 2014). Having 
different management is essential because women create more business-
to-business links and, thereby, they make the firm perform better 
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(Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). Women are good at mentoring employees and, 
thus, boosting their career growth and, consequently, job satisfaction. 
Ultimately, these improve the firm’s performance (Wahid, 2018). 
Gender diversity and, particularly, having more women can reduce 
a firm’s performance as a result of demographic demerits, interpersonal 
conflicts and their related effects (Jurkus et al., 2011). Gender diversity 
provides room for more battles because of divergent views and 
stereotypical behaviour. Conflicts cause lack of cohesion among members 
of a group (Ferreira, 2015). When conflict exists within a team, the firm’s 
operational functions become compromised and this results in poor 
performance (Low et al., 2015). Conflicts can slow down the decision-
making process and, thus, have an adverse effect on the firm’s 
performance (Dwyer et al., 2003). According to Dutta and Bose (2007), 
stereotypical views, especially in countries where men are perceived to be 
at the top in every setting, affect cooperation among the team. However, 
Croson and Gneezy’s (2009) findings show that women are at greater risk 
than men because of their emotions, characteristics and overconfidence. 
Also, women display lower performance in both a bargaining setting and 
a purely competitive situation (Croson & Gneezy, 2009). 
In their study of gender diversity, Carter et al. (2010) and Rose, 
(2007) reported that they did not find a significant relationship between 
gender diversity and firm performance. Besides, she asserts that, 
although women have a very high representation on American and 
United Kingdom firms’ boards, they have an extremely low 
representation on Danish firms’ boards (Rose, 2007). Alowaihan’s (2004), 
findings show that Kuwaiti women are better educated than men, but 
they do not have as much experience as men in the workplace. In 
addition, his findings show no significant differences between men and 
women in family firms. This is because of several reasons such as being 
married and having children; this means that women have more 
responsibility than men (Alowaihan, 2004). i 
The relationship between age diversity and firm performance has 
suffered from an absence of detailed analysis. Moreover, because of 
sharing experiences and acquiring skills age diversity is an essential 
factor of a firm’s performance. Also, young board members include female 
directors because, compared to older board directors, they are more able 
to think in a new creative way (Carter et al., 2003). According to Choi 
and Rainey (2010) there is a positive relationship in American firms 
between age diversity and performance. Also, Darmadi’s (2011) findings 
show a similar positive result in that young directors increase a firm’s 
financial performance. Pitts (2005) noted that in a firm with age 
diversity employees were likely to increase their confidence because they 
believed that they had an opportunity to grow their careers within its 
ranks. Interestingly, Dagsson and Larsson (2011) demonstrate that, 
while there is a positive relationship between age diversity and Return 
on Assets (ROA), there is a negative relationship in Swedish firms with 
Tobin’s Q because ROA does not measure the market’s performance 
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value but measures the firm’s performance. 
However, Tanikawa et al. (2017) demonstrate that older board 
members are more motivated than younger directors. Additionally, most 
of the directors in Malaysian firms are aged between 50 and 59 years old 
and the average age is 58. Consequently, there is a lack of age diversity 
on such firms’ boards (Abdullah, Ismail & Izah, 2017). Furthermore, 
Kunze et al. (2013) and Shahata et al. (2017) findings show that there is 
a negative relationship between age diversity and firm performance. 
According to Diepen (2015) findings, the ages of directors between 41 to 
50 years have a negative correlation between age diversity and 
performance. The findings of research by Ali et al. (2014), Ali and Kulik 
(2014) and Abdullah et al. (2017) findings show that, measured by ROA, 
there is a negative relationship between age diversity and firm 
performance. In Germany, their findings show that, because of choosing 
the board’s age according to the age discrimination environment within 
firms, there is a negative correlation between age diversity and firm 
performance (Kunze et al., 2011). In the United Kingdom, Shehata’s et 
al. (2017) findings show that there is a significant negative relationship 
between age diversity and firm performance. Eulerich et al. (2014) 
findings show that there is a negative correlation between age diversity 
and firm performance, and they explain that considerable board diversity 
may reduce the decision-making process and communication between 
board members. On the other hand, Tanikawa et al. (2017) findings show 
that, when the board members are relatively older, there is a significant 
negative relationship between age diversity and ROE. However, this is 
not the case in terms of ROA. 
In addition, their findings show that in Dutch firms there is no 
relatonship between the directors’ age group and firm performance 
(Diepen, 2015). Rahman’s et al. (2015) findings show that age diversity 
can overcome the board’s problems and encourage creative thinking. On 
the other hand, similarly aged board members reduce the firm’s 
performance. However, if there is some age diversity within the board, it 
can improve the firm’s performance (Rahman et al., 2015). In addition, in 
Australia, the findings show that in Australian firms age diversity has 
no significant effect on employee productivity (Ali & Kulik, 2014). There 
are various conclusions about the effect of age diversity on a firm’s 
performance (Carter et al., 2003). 
Also, there is a lack of information in the literature about national 
diversity and firm performance. Nationality diversity affects, also, both 
in a positive and negative manner, a firm’s economic performance. By 
using the available literature, many authors, such as Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2005), Hart (2004), Kaczmarek (2009) and Diepen (2015), 
examined the relationship between national diversity and firm 
performance. Their main focus was to determine the pros and cons of 
national diversity and firm performance by considering the employees’ 
perceptions of employees and by not investigating only one country. 
These research studies show a positive relationship between national 
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diversity and firm performance. Further, Harjoto et al. (2015) 
conclusions show that boards of management with international 
diversity are more likely to perform better because of their different 
knowledge, perspectives and the board’s experiences in problem-solving. 
Similarly, Delis’s et al. (2016) findings show that an internationally 
diverse board of directors is more likely to have a positive influence on 
the firm’s performance. This is because employees seek to work diligently 
within the parameters of international standards. Also, Hart (2004) and 
Diepen’s (2015) findings show that immigrant entrepreneurs have a 
negative effect on the firm’s performance organization and, more 
particularly, when only international board directors occupy the top 
management positions. Such a firm creates an environment whereby the 
employees have little or no confidence about working in the firm because 
all the top managers are of the same nationality. Also, Kaczmarek (2009) 
conducted similar research about nationality diversity and firm 
performance. His findings show that, when the firm’s directors work with 
international diversity in the subordinate staff, they tend to have faith in 
the firm’s policies organization and, thus, this leads to the firm 
performing better. Besides, in his study, Darmadi (2011) argues that 
international diversity has no influence in in both a firm’s marketing 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q and accounting measured by ROA 
performance. This means that national diversity has nothing to do with 
firm performance. 
 
2.3. Description of gaps in the research literature 
 
There were several studies have not been addressed in the literature. 
Reviewing the previous literature, it can be considered that there is a 
lack Kuwait’s 2013 CG code. In addition, there had been a lack of 
significant research into board diversity and earnings management, 
gender diversity on board including CEO, and nationality diversity and 
firm performance in GCC countries and, more particularly, in Kuwait. 
Besides, there is no research found on age diversity and earnings 
management. Also, more generally in the literature, there were few 
references to board diversity and earnings management. Also, there is no 
GCC and more particularly in Kuwait use oil price and percentage 
change in oil price as a control variable. More specifically, there is no 
Kuwaiti research with a large sample and time period that measures and 
there are no Kuwaiti research studies that used the model modified by 
Jones (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) to measure earnings management, 
beside total shareholder return to measure firm performance. 
 
2.4. Importance and contribution of the proposed research 
 
This study is the first Kuwaiti study and represents a significant 
contribution to Kuwaiti literature and empirical studies. In particular, 
this study evaluates whether or not the 2013 Kuwait CG code has been 
successful in promoting effective board diversity. Also, no previous study 
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has tested board diversity and earnings management in GCC countries 
and, more particularly, in Kuwait. Moreover, the only research in the 
literature that test age diversity and EM. Besides, this is the only study 
that has applied both the modified Jones and Kothari model to GCC 
countries and, more particularly, to Kuwait. In addition, the literature 
shows that few studies have investigated the relationship between board 
diversity and performance in GCC countries and, more particularly, in 
Kuwait. Furthermore, this is the only Kuwaiti study that has tested 
gender diversity on board members including the CEO. It is the only 
study that has measured performance by total shareholder return in 
GCC countries and, more particularly, in Kuwait. This study uses the 
largest sample of Kuwait non-financial listed companies and the most up 
to date data. Also, it is the only research that used oil price and the 
percentage change of oil price as a control variable in Kuwait. In 
addition, it is the only research that used gold price and the percentage 
change of oil price as a control variable in literature. This study will be 
important for companies to be aware of how gender, age and national 
diversity may affect the earnings management in Kuwait.  
 
3. RESEARCH OUTLINE  
 
3.1. Research design 
 
All the data is collected from secondary sources such as Capital IQ, 
Boursa Kuwait and Bloomberg databases and the companies’ annual 
reports. The proposed analysis method is quantitative analysis 
“Regression type”. The reason for proposing a quantitative analysis 
method and mainly regression analysis is that almost all previous 
empirical studies about board diversity and earnings management and 
performance have used quantitative methods. Therefore, this study is 
consistent with them. 
 
3.2. Data description 
 
The data will be from 103 listed Kuwaiti non-financial companies. The 
exclusion of the country’s 67 financial enterprises from the sample is 
mainly due to the complex structure of financial institutions and the 
way, on the one hand, that they are governed and operate and, on the 
other hand, because their corporate governance structure and practices 
are different to those in non-financial companies. Furthermore, most 
previous studies such as Peni and Vahamma (2010), and Gull et al. 
(2018), which have examined the impact of board diversity and earnings 
management in addition to performance, have excluded financial 
companies. Therefore, it is essential to apply the same process for 
consistent analysis.  
The data, which relates to the board of directors, earnings 
management and firm performance, is collected manually from Boursa 
Kuwait, capital IQ and the Bloomberg database. The period of study is 
“Corporate Governance: Search for the Advanced Practices” 
Rome, February 28, 2019 
 
266 
from 2010 to 2017 inclusive. The reason for choosing this period is, 
firstly, because it provides data from the latest available period. 
Secondly, this period follows the major development of various corporate 
governance practices in 2010 and, therefore, the data related to the latest 
practices of corporate governance. Thirdly, this period is before and after 
the introduction of the Kuwaiti Corporate Governance Code in June 
2013. 
The data, related to the board structure, is data relevant to board 
size, gender diversity on the board, age diversity, nationality diversity, 
board independence, company age, company size, total number of 
departments, total revenue, industry type, rule duality & CEO diversity. 
The data, related to firm performance, includes both accounting based 
performances and market-based performance. Earnings management is 
measured by the model modified by Jones (1995) and Kothari (2005). The 
variables, used to represent or measure these data, are as follows: 
 
Table 1. The measured variables 
 
The variables Represent or measure 
- Board size  
The board size is measured simply by the total number of board 
members (both executive and non-executive directors). 
- Board 
independence 
The board independence is measured by the percentage of 
independent non-executive directors out of the total number of 
directors (i.e. the ratio of independent directors to total board 
size). 
- Gender diversity 
The gender diversity is measured simply by the percentage of 
women on the board out of the total number of directors, beside 
the CEO (i.e. the ratio of women directors to total board size). 
- Age diversity 
The director age to the average age of the directors of each board 
is first determined (i.e. the ratio of director age to average age the 
directors on board). 
- Nationality 
diversity 
The nationality diversity is measured simply by the percentage of 
non-Kuwaiti director on the board out of the total number of 
Kuwaiti directors (i.e. the ratio of non-Kuwaiti directors to total 
Kuwaiti directors on board). 
- Other data 
“Control variables” 
In addition to the main two types of data (i.e. board diversity and 
earnings management, board diversity and firm performance) 
additional data are used to identify whether or not the non-
corporate governance variable has an impact on EM & FP. These 
data are company size, company age, total revenue, total debt, 
leverage, oil price, the percentage change in oil price, gold price 
and percentage change of gold price, and industry type. This 
research uses correlation analysis to examine a linear relationship 
between two variables and multi-regression analysis to examine 
the dependent variable with many independent variables. 
 
Earnings management: the following two models are used to test the 
impact of board diversity and earnings management. The first one is the 
modified Jones model (1995). 
 
            (
 
      
)     (            )          
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Where      is total accruals of company i, AT is total assets in the 
beginning of the year, ∆    is revenues in year t minus revenues in year 
t-1, ∆AR  is net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t-1 and 
     is the gross property, plant and equipment in year t. a1, a2     a3 
are obtained by estimating the equation using each firm in industry.  
The second one is the modified Kothari model (2005): 
 
            (
 
      
)     (            )                   
                                                
(2) 
 
Where      is total accruals of company i, AT is total assets in the 
beginning of the year, ∆    is revenues in year t minus revenues in year 
t-1, ∆AR  is net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t-1 and 
     is the gross property, plant and equipment in year t. a1, a2     a3 
are obtained by estimating the equation using each firm in industry. In 
addition of a4; ROA is the Return on Asset.  
Firm performance: two types of financial performance, namely, 
accounting-based measures and market-based measures are used to test 
the impact of board diversity and their effectiveness on short-term and 
long-term performance. For the accounting-based measures, we use ROA 
and ROE and, for the market-based measure we use Tobin’s Q calculated 
by dividing market value of the firm by replacement value of the 
company’s assets. The reason for using Tobin’s Q is that it includes a 
long-term element in its calculation and because most it most the 
corporate governance and performance studies have used this measure. 
In addition, total shareholder return (TSR) represents a percentage of 
the company’s performance over a particular period of time as reflected 
in the values of its various stocks and shares. TSR measured by the use 
of the dividend adjusted share price of 1ast of January and 31 of 
December of the same year and takes the percentage change. 
 
3.3. Methods and choice of analysis 
 
The proposed quantitative analysis methods use correlation, multi-
regression and robust analysis. The author used the following models to 
examine the influence of independent and control variables on EM, 
beside firm performance:  
 
                                                   
                                 
(3) 
 
                                                   
                                 
(4) 
where:  
    is the Constant; GD is Gender diversity; AD is Age Diversity; ND 
is Nationality diversity; BSZ is board size; BID is board independence; 
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DUAL is role duality; CSZ is company size; CA is company age; CID is 
company industry; TD is Total Debt; TR is total revenue; L is leverage; 
and ε is the error term  
The following table summarizes the main variables, which we used, 
and their definitions. 
 
Table 2. The main variables, their definitions & source 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent Variables: 
Earnings management 
(EM) 
By modified Jones model (1995) and Kothari 
model (2005), following (Ittonen et al. 2013). 
Capital IQ 
Return on Assets (ROA) Profits divided by total assets Capital IQ 
Return of Equity (ROE) Dividing net income by shareholders’ equity. Capital IQ 
Tobin’s Q (TQ) 
The ratio of the market value of a 
company's assets (as measured by the 
market value of its outstanding stock and 
debt) divided by the replacement cost of the 
business's assets (book value). 
Capital IQ 
Total shareholder return 
(TSR) 
The dividend-adjusted share price of 1/1 and 
31/12 of the same year and takes the 
percentage change. 
Capital IQ 
Independent variables: 
Board size (BSZ) Total number of directors  Annual report 
Board independence 
(BID) 
The proportion of independent directors to 
total board 
Annual report 
Role duality (DUAL) Director also holds the CEO position Annual report 
Gender diversity (GD) The ratio of women directors to total board size Annual report 
Woman Chair (WC) 
Dummy variable coded 0 if chair is woman, 
and 1 otherwise. 
Annual report 
Woman Chair Assistant 
(WCA) 
Dummy variable coded 0 if chair assistant is 
woman, and 1 otherwise. 
Annual report 
Woman CEO (WCEO) 
Dummy variable coded 0 if CEO is woman, 
and 1 otherwise. 
Annual report 
Age diversity (AD) 
The ratio of director age to average age the 
directors on board 
Annual report 
National diversity (ND) 
The ratio of non-Kuwaiti directors to total 
Kuwaiti directors on board 
Annual report 
Control Variables: 
Company size (CSZ) Total assets Capital IQ 
Industry (CID) Industry type Annual report 
Company age (CA) Number of years of business operation Boursa Kuwait 
Total Debt (TD) Total liabilities Capital IQ 
Total Revenue (TR) Total income of the firm. Capital IQ 
Leverage (L) Total debt divided by total equity. Capital IQ 
Oil Price (OP) The oil price in the 31st of Dec. Capital IQ 
Percentage change in oil 
price (COP) 
The percentage change in yearly oil price. Capital IQ 
Gold Price The gold price in the 31st of Dec. Capital IQ 
Percentage change in 
gold price (CGP) 
The percentage change in yearly gold price. Capital IQ 
 
3.4. Expected outcomes  
 
After having regard to the literature review, the author obtains the 
primary results: 
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Table 3. Expected outcomes 
 
Research hypotheses Relationships Source 
H1: There is a negative association 
between gender diversity and 
earnings management in Kuwait. 
- 
Agency theory, Resource 
dependent theory, Human capital 
theory & Literature Review 
H2: There is a negative association 
between average age and earnings 
management in Kuwait. 
- 
Resource-dependent theory, 
Human capital theory & Social 
capital theory 
H3: There is a negative association 
between nationality diversity and 
earnings management in Kuwait. 
- 
Resource-dependent theory, 
Human capital theory & Social 
capital theory 
H4: There is a positive association 
between gender diversity and firm 
performance in Kuwait. 
+ 
Agency theory, Resource 
dependent theory & Human 
capital theory 
H5: There is a positive association 
between average age and firm 
performance in Kuwait. 
+ 
Resource-dependent theory, 
Human capital theory & Social 
capital theory 
H6: There is a positive association 
between nationality diversity and 
firm performance in Kuwait. 
+ 
Resource-dependent theory, 
Human capital theory & Social 
capital theory 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
The main limitations of the methods which to be applied can be 
summarized as follow: Quantitative methods indicate whether there is a 
relationship between the variables. However, it does not provide an 
explanation for such a relationshi p. Also, the data was so hard to obtain 
it. Besides, no similar research in Kuwait or GCC countries. Finally, the 
study will be limited to Kuwait and may not be applicable to other 
regions. This study will be important for companies to be aware of how 
gender, age and national diversity may affect the earnings management 
and firm performance in Kuwait.  
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